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Abstract 
 
While prior studies have examined how investors perceive extreme forms of tax avoidance 
behavior such as tax sheltering and uncertain tax position (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; 
Wilson 2009; Koester 2011; Hutchens and Rego 2012), there is little evidence on how 
investors perceive less extreme forms of tax avoidance. This study fills this void by 
examining the relation between firm’s cost of equity and corporate tax avoidance using three 
measures that capture less extreme forms of corporate tax avoidance: book-tax differences, 
permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates. We find that less 
aggressive forms of corporate tax avoidance significantly reduces a firm’s cost of equity. 
Further analyses reveal that this effect is stronger for (i) firms with better outside monitoring, 
(ii) firms that likely realize higher marginal benefits from tax savings, and (iii) firms with 
better information quality. Our study presents large-sample results on how investors perceive 
less aggressive corporate tax avoidance and shows that tax planning is a value-enhancing 
activity for shareholders.  
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
How investors perceive tax avoidance behavior has been an area of emerging interest. 
For instance, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) study how investors react to tax sheltering activities 
and find that a company’s stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in 
tax shelters. In contrast, Wilson (2009) finds that tax shelter firms are associated with higher 
future stock returns when corporate governance is strong, and Gallemore et al. (2012) find 
that firms, and their top executives, do not appear to bear significant reputational costs from 
engaging in tax sheltering. Other studies focus on how investors perceive tax reserves 
disclosed under FIN 48. For instance, Koester (2011) examines equity investors’ valuation of 
tax avoidance achieved through uncertain tax position under FIN 48 and finds that investors 
value uncertain tax avoidance positively on average. In contrast, Hutchens and Rego (2012) 
find that higher tax reserves are associated with a higher cost of capital, which suggests that 
investors require a higher rate of return for the risky tax position, consistent with Wilson’s 
(2008) results for well governed firms. Overall, these studies focus on more extreme forms of 
corporate tax avoidance activities and the result are inconclusive on how equity investors 
perceive aggressive tax sheltering and risky tax position.
1
 Our paper extends these studies by 
examining how investors perceive less aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance 
affects a firm’s cost of equity.  
We motivate the link between tax avoidance and cost of equity by relying on Lambert 
et al. (2007) who develop a model in a single-period, multisecurity CAPM setting that links 
the quality of accounting disclosures and information systems to firm risk and cost of equity. 
In this model, the quality of accounting information influences the cost of equity both directly 
and indirectly. The direct effect occurs when accounting information quality affects market 
                                                          
1
 Lisowsky et al. (2012) provide evidence that tax reserves are superior predictors of tax shelter activity relative 
to other measures of aggressive tax avoidance. Hence, we also treat tax reserves as an aggressive form of tax 
avoidance behavior.   
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participants’ assessments of the variance of the firm’s own cash flows as well as the 
covariance with other firms’ cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. Higher accounting 
information quality allows better assessment of the firm’s cash flows, reduces information 
uncertainty and hence leads to lower cost of equity. The indirect effect occurs when 
accounting information quality affects the firm’s real decisions, and thus the firm’s future 
expected cash flows. Higher accounting quality reduces managerial misappropriation of the 
firm’s cash flow and enhances production and/or investment decisions, and therefore leads to 
higher expected cash flows generated by the firm and a lower cost of equity (Lambert et al. 
2007, pp.392).2 
Applying the Lambert et al. (2007) model to our setting of corporate tax avoidance, 
tax avoidance can increase the firm’s cost of equity via its direct effect on investors’ 
assessments of firm risk. Tax avoidance behavior can increase the opacity of a firm’s 
information environment (Balakrishnan et al. 2011) and lead to more aggressive financial 
reporting (Frank et al. 2009), both of which may impair the quality or precision of the firm’s 
accounting information and thereby increase investors’ uncertainty of the firm’s future cash 
flows.  
On the other hand, tax avoidance via its indirect effect on the firm’s expected future 
cash flows could either increase or decrease the firm’s cost of equity. Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) and Desai et al, (2007) argue and provide evidence consistent with their argument that 
there are complementarities between tax avoidance behavior and diversion, such that 
managers can use tax avoidance activities to extract rent from shareholders. If greater tax 
                                                          
2
 That the expected future cash flow affects the cost of equity capital in the Lambert et al. (2007) model might 
surprise some readers as expected cash flows is often thought of as the numerator in a discounted cash flow 
valuation  model. Lambert et al. (2007, pp.392) clarify this relationship as follows: “Perhaps the most surprising 
result is that an increase in the expected value of cash flows decreases the expected rate of return. The intuition, 
however, is fairly straightforward. Consider a firm with two components of cash flow: a riskless component and 
a risky component. Clearly, the cost of capital for the firm is somewhere in between the cost of capital for the 
riskless component and the cost of capital for the risky component. But if the firm’s expected cash flow 
increases without affecting the firm’s variances or covariances, this is exactly analogous to adding a new 
riskless component of cash flow to the firm’s existing cash flow. The firm’s cost of capital therefore decreases.”  
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avoidance increases the firm’s assets appropriated by managers, this would result in lower 
cash flows available to investors. Finally, the firm suffers potential compliance or reputation 
costs in the event that the tax avoidance behavior is discovered by the IRS, hence decreasing 
expected cash flows and increasing the cost of capital. 
Conversely, in the context of the Lambert et al. (2007) model, cash savings from tax 
planning can be interpreted as cash flow appropriated by the firm from the tax authorities, 
which increases expected future cash flows. Every dollar saved from paying tax can also be 
redeployed to more productive uses. For a firm that faces financial constraints in funding its 
profitable investment opportunities, the cash savings from tax can be utilized to fund these 
investments, which would otherwise be foregone.
3
 In addition, efficient tax planning usually 
involves complex structuring of transactions to minimize the overall corporate tax burden. 
Investors may perceive managers who are able to effectively lower the tax burden as more 
capable and able to make better production and/or investment decisions, thus increasing their 
expectation of the firm’s future cash flows. Finally, diversified and thus less risk-averse 
shareholders prefer risk-averse and under-diversified managers to increase firm risk optimally 
and to undertake risky but value-increasing activities (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). If 
investors perceive tax avoidance as risk-taking activity that has a positive net present value, 
this can increase the expected future cash flows and reduce the cost of equity.  
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) recommend that researchers carefully consider the 
appropriateness of tax avoidance measures for the research question at hand. They also state, 
“If tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies where something like 
municipal bond investments are at one end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms 
such as “noncompliance,” “evasion,” “aggressiveness,” and “sheltering” would be closer to 
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 Edwards et al. (2012) find that firms facing financial constraints undertake more tax avoidance in order to save 
tax cash outflows. Consequently, these cash flows could be employed to fund profitable investment 
opportunities. 
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the other end of the continuum.” Given the Lambert et al. (2007) model, more aggressive 
forms of tax avoidance are likely to result in increased opacity of the financial statements, 
possible increased agency concerns and increased compliance and reputation risks while also 
saving taxes. Thus it is not clear which effect, the direct or indirect effect under the Lambert 
et al. model, will dominate for aggressive tax avoidance activities and this might explain the 
prior inconclusive evidence on how equity investors view aggressive tax avoidance.  
However, less aggressive and less risky tax avoidance activities are less likely to result in 
opaque financial statements, agency problems and compliance and reputation risks such that 
the indirect effect in the Lambert et al. model of increased after-tax cash flows is likely to 
dominate the direct effects resulting in a prediction that greater tax avoidance arising from 
less aggressive forms will result in lower cost of equity. We test this latter prediction. 
Lisowsky et al. (2012) suggest that the probability of engaging in tax sheltering, discretionary 
permanent book-tax difference, permanent book-tax difference, book-tax difference, and cash 
effective tax rates capture the varying degree of tax aggressiveness, from most aggressive to 
least aggressive. Thus given that our study aims to explore how investors perceive the less 
aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance, we focus on the following measures: book-
tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates.
4
  
Hereafter we use the term tax avoidance to refer to less aggressive forms of tax planning and 
use the term tax aggressive to refer to more aggressive forms of tax planning. 
We test the relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity using a large sample 
of firms from 1993-2010. We find that greater levels of all of our three measures of tax 
avoidance are associated with a lower cost of equity capital, proxied by an implied cost of 
capital estimate, which is an ex ante cost of equity measure inferred from current stock prices 
and analysts’ forecast of future earnings (Easton 2004; Botosan and Plumlee 2005). To 
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 We acknowledge that these three measures will also reflect the outcomes of aggressive tax planning such as 
tax shelters but will, as Lisowky et al. (2012) point out, be much more reflective of less aggressive tax planning. 
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further corroborate our findings, we conduct cross-sectional analyses to determine whether 
this effect is stronger for firms with better outside monitoring, for firms that accrue higher 
marginal benefits from tax savings, and for firms with better information quality because 
these firms are more likely to gain from tax avoidance and rational investors will perceive tax 
avoidance behavior in these firms more positively. The results are also consistent with our 
expectations. Our results are also robust to using three alternative measures of cost of equity, 
two alternative measures of less aggressive tax avoidance, and using a changes specification.  
Finally, when we use proxies for more aggressive forms of tax planning, we find that 
the more aggressive tax avoidance is either not associated or positively associated with cost 
of equity. This result is consistent with our analysis of the Lambert et al. model that the direct 
effects become more salient when studying tax aggressive forms of tax planning. Overall, the 
results suggest that investors perceive less aggressive and less risky tax avoidance activities 
positively and reward firms that engage in these activities with a lower cost of equity.
5
 
 Our study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it extends the 
literature on how investors perceive corporate tax avoidance behavior. While prior studies 
examine how investors perceive extreme forms of tax avoidance behavior such as tax 
sheltering and uncertain tax position and the results are inconclusive (Hanlon and Slemrod 
2009, Wilson 2009; Gallemore et al. 2012; Koester 2011; Hutchens and Rego 2012), there is 
little evidence on how investors perceive less extreme forms of tax avoidance in general. Our 
study complements these studies by examining how the less aggressive and less risky forms 
of tax avoidance activities affect the firm’s cost of equity. A contemporaneous study by 
Hutchens and Rego (2012) examines the relation between a firm’s tax reserves and cost of 
capital. However, their focus is on examining whether tax reserves capture uncertainty 
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 Not all firms will avoid taxes to the same extent to reduce their cost of equity. Firms trade-off the marginal 
benefits against the marginal costs of managing taxes. The benefits of tax avoidance include greater tax savings, 
while the costs include planning and implementation costs, potential penalties imposed by tax authorities and 
reputation costs. Hence, firms choose their “optimal” level of tax avoidance in their tax reporting.  
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surrounding a firm’s tax positions (i.e., tax risk), and they find that tax reserve is significantly 
positively associated with the cost of equity capital. This result is not necessarily at odds with 
ours, given that tax reserves are superior predictors of tax sheltering activity (Lisowsky et al. 
2012) and hence represent a more aggressive and more risky form of tax avoidance. Our 
study complements their finding and we document that less aggressive and less risky forms of 
tax avoidance, such as book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences and cash 
effective tax rates, are associated with a lower cost of equity.  
 Second, our study adds to the debate on the corporate governance view of tax 
avoidance. While Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. (2007) argue that aggressive 
tax avoidance facilitates managerial rent extraction, Blaylock (2011) fails to find evidence to 
support this contention. In fact, using a large panel of US firms, he finds that tax avoidance is 
positively associated with performance and with more optimal investment policy, even 
among poorly governed firms. Similar to Blaylock (2011), we find little evidence to support 
economically significant diversion of tax savings or misappropriation of assets through tax 
avoidance activities. In fact, our results suggest that tax avoidance, at least less aggressive 
forms, transfers wealth from tax authorities to shareholders and hence shareholders view this 
positively, which results in a lower cost of equity capital. This result also potentially explains 
why many US corporations provide incentives to employees to reduce tax burdens (Robinson 
et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012). If tax avoidance behavior is undesirable from the 
shareholders’ viewpoint, it is difficult to reconcile the prevalence of tax planning in US 
corporations despite the relatively strong corporate governance and legal environment in the 
US.
6
 This study thus highlights that corporate tax avoidance, as long as it is not too 
aggressive, may be value-enhancing from investors’ and firms’ perspective.  
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 For example, Dyreng et al. (2008) find that approximately one-fourth of their sample firms are able to maintain 
long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, which suggests that many US firms engage in significant tax 
planning activities. 
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 The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
findings in related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our 
research methodology. We present and discuss the results in Section 4.  Section 5 reports 
additional analyses and sensitivity tests and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Lambert et al. (2007) model  
To develop testable hypotheses relating tax avoidance and the cost of equity, we rely 
on Lambert et al. (2007) who develop a model in a single-period multi-security CAPM 
setting that links the quality of accounting disclosures and information systems to firm risk 
and cost of equity. In this model, the authors express the cost of equity, given the information 
available to market participants , as follows (their equation 4b): 
 ( ̃ | )  
   ( )   
 ( )   
       ( )  
 ( ̃   )
 
     ( ̃  ∑  ̃   )
 
   
                                            ( ) 
From this expression, the cost of equity for a firm is affected by the: 1) risk-free rate   ; 2) 
aggregate market risk tolerance   ; 3) expected future cash flow  ( ̃ ) and; 4) covariance of 
the firm’s cash flow with the sum of all firms’ cash flows in the market    ( ̃  ∑  ̃ )
 
   . As 
noted  earlier, that the expected future cash flow affects the cost of equity capital in the 
Lambert et al. (2007) model might surprise some readers as expected cash flows is often 
thought of as the numerator in a discounted cash flow valuation  model. Lambert et al. (2007, 
pp.392) clarify this relationship as follows: “Perhaps the most surprising result is that an 
increase in the expected value of cash flows decreases the expected rate of return. The 
intuition, however, is fairly straightforward. Consider a firm with two components of cash 
flow: a riskless component and a risky component. Clearly, the cost of capital for the firm is 
somewhere in between the cost of capital for the riskless component and the cost of capital 
for the risky component. But if the firm’s expected cash flow increases without affecting the 
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firm’s variances or covariances, this is exactly analogous to adding a new riskless component 
of cash flow to the firm’s existing cash flow. The firm’s cost of capital therefore decreases.”  
The quality of accounting information influences the cost of equity both directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect occurs when accounting information quality affects the market 
participants’ assessments of the variance of the firm’s own cash flows as well as the 
covariance with other firms’ cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. Higher accounting 
information quality helps market participants to better assess the variance and covariance of 
the firm’s cash flows, reduces information uncertainty and hence leads to a lower cost of 
equity. The indirect effect occurs when accounting information quality affects the firm’s real 
decisions, which affects the firm’s future expected cash flows. Higher accounting quality 
reduces managerial misappropriation of the firm’s cash flow and enhances manager’s 
production and/or investment decisions and therefore leads to higher expected cash flows 
generated by the firm and a lower cost of equity.
7
 
 
2.2 Linking tax avoidance and the cost of equity  
Based on the Lambert et al. (2007) model, we argue that tax avoidance can either 
increase or decrease the firm’s cost of equity. In this section we use the term tax avoidance to 
cover all forms of tax avoidance from the most aggressive to the most benign. We narrow the 
definition later. On one hand, tax avoidance behavior increases the firm’s cost of equity via 
its direct effect on investors’ assessments of firm risk. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) argue that 
tax planning can increase the complexity of the organization and, to the extent that this 
greater complexity cannot be adequately communicated to outside parties (such as equity 
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 In this discussion, we assume that  ( ) is increasing in expected cash flows  ( ̃   ). However, this is not 
true universally because  ( )is also driven by    ( ̃  ∑  ̃   )
 
   , which in turn is also affected by changes in 
expected cash flows. The equilibrium effect on the cost of equity is ambiguous (See Proposition 3 and 4 of 
Lambert et al. (2007) for more details). Following Lambert et al. (2007), we assume a more general case that 
higher accounting information quality leads to higher expected cash flows and a lower  ( )  which results in a 
lower cost of equity. 
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investors, creditors, and analysts), transparency problems can arise. Their finding of 
associations between tax avoidance (proxied by the firm’s effective tax rates) and measures 
of information uncertainty, information asymmetry and earnings quality suggests that tax 
avoidance behavior increases the opacity of a firm’s information environment. Desai (2004) 
discusses the example of Enron in which tax avoidance activities give rise to earnings 
manipulation opportunities that can mislead investors. In addition, Frank et al. (2009) find a 
strong positive association between tax avoidance and aggressive financial reporting.
8
 Their 
results suggest that insufficient costs exist to offset financial and tax reporting incentives, 
such that nonconformity between financial accounting standards and tax rules allows firms to 
manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same reporting period. To 
the extent that lower financial reporting quality increases information uncertainty, their 
results provide additional evidence that tax avoidance results in greater financial opacity and 
information asymmetry. Taken together, these three studies suggest that tax avoidance could 
impair the quality or precision of the firm’s accounting signals and thereby increases 
investors’ uncertainty of the firm’s future cash flows and result in higher cost of equity.  
Within the Lambert et al. (2007) framework, tax avoidance can also increase the 
firm’s cost of equity via its indirect effect on the firm’s expected future cash flows. This 
indirect effect includes the amount of firm cash flows that managers appropriate for 
themselves. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that complementarities exist between tax 
sheltering and rent extraction activities (e.g., earnings manipulation). In particular, they find 
that higher incentive compensation is associated with lower tax avoidance, and this negative 
effect is driven primarily by firms with weaker governance. The authors interpret their 
evidence as consistent with agency costs diminishing the benefits of corporate tax avoidance 
to shareholders. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) also discuss the example of Dynergy in which 
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 In contrast, Lennox et al. (2012) find that tax avoidance firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud, an 
extreme form of earnings management. 
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tax sheltering activities can facilitate managerial misrepresentation and destroy shareholder 
value. Consistent with this notion, Desai et al. (2007) find that firms targeted by enforcement 
actions experience an increase in market value after an increase in tax enforcement in Russia. 
This result suggests that even though tax avoidance activities save investors cash, investors 
are aware of the potential managerial self-dealing and react favorably to regulatory actions 
that prevent managers from transferring corporate resources under the cover of or through tax 
transactions. Hence, greater tax avoidance can exacerbate the agency problems between the 
firm and its shareholders increasing the firm’s assets appropriated by management, resulting 
in lower cash flows available to investors. Finally, to the extent that the firm’s tax avoidance 
activities are deemed by the IRS and the tax courts to be noncompliance, it may be 
disallowed and subject to additional taxes, fines, interest and penalties (Mills 1998; Hanlon 
and Slemrod 2009). This outcome can further reduce the expected cash flows to the firm. In 
sum, corporate tax avoidance can increase the firm’s cost of equity, both directly and 
indirectly. 
On the other hand, tax avoidance can decrease the firm’s cost of equity via its indirect 
effect on the firm’s expected future cash flows. The most obvious benefit of tax planning is 
cash tax-savings. In the context of Lambert et al. (2007) model, this benefit of tax avoidance 
can be interpreted as cash flow appropriated by the firm from the tax authorities, and 
therefore this appropriation is predicted to increase expected cash flows and thus reduce the 
firm’s cost of equity. Every dollar saved from paying tax can also be redeployed to more 
productive uses. For a firm that faces financial constraints in funding its profitable investment 
opportunities, the cash savings from tax avoidance can be utilized to fund these investments 
that would otherwise be foregone (Edwards et al. 2012). For a firm in a fast-growing 
environment, the tax savings can be utilized to help fund its sales growth.  
11 
 
The above arguments, nonetheless, assume that the managers’ interests are aligned 
with those of shareholders, and hence managers do not seek to appropriate all tax savings for 
themselves or to use tax avoidance to mask other rent extraction activities. This assumption 
may be too strong in light of the findings in Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. 
(2007) that managers can redirect tax savings to themselves. Blaylock (2011), however, 
cautions that the relation between rent extraction and tax avoidance may not be applicable in 
the US setting. Using a large panel of US firms, he cannot find any consistent evidence that 
tax avoidance is related to managerial rent extraction. He suggests that earlier finding of an 
association between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction in Russia (Desai et al. 2007) 
may not be applicable in a strong legal and governance environment such as the US. Hence, 
to the extent that any association between managerial rent extraction and tax avoidance is 
tempered by the strong governance environment in the US, we expect corporate tax 
avoidance to result in an overall net increase in expected cash flows to shareholders. 
 Tax avoidance can also enhance the firm’s real decisions such as production and/or 
investment decisions, thereby increasing the expected firm cash flow and reducing the cost of 
equity. Efficient tax planning usually involves complex structuring of transactions such as 
transfer pricing, setting up offshore intellectual property havens and centralizing operating 
activities in tax-friendly jurisdictions to minimize the overall corporate tax burden.
9
 
Managers who are able to effectively lower tax burdens are likely to be more capable and 
make better production and/or investment decisions, thus increasing investors’ expectation of 
firm future cash flows. Consistent with this notion, Blaylock (2011) finds that tax avoidance 
is positively associated with future firm operating performance. He interprets this evidence as 
consistent with tax avoidance on average enhancing firm profitability and/or with tax 
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 For example, some corporations may take advantage of tax breaks and/or tax holidays offered in certain 
countries (such as Singapore and Vietnam) to centralize their regional administrative, research and development, 
manufacturing or logistics function to reduce overall tax burden and to reap economies of scale in these 
operating activities. 
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avoidance being a positive signal in general about managerial talent. He also finds that higher 
levels of tax avoidance are associated with relatively more optimal investment policy, 
consistent with managers of tax avoidance firms making better investment decisions. 
 Finally, investors could perceive managers who undertake tax avoidance activity as 
willing to take on more risks in production and/or investment decisions. Risk-neutral 
shareholders (who can diversify firm risk across various securities in their investment 
portfolio) prefer risk-averse and under-diversified managers to increase firm risk optimally 
and to undertake risky but value-increasing activities (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). In line 
with this notion, Rego and Wilson (2012) find a positive association between option vega and 
corporate tax avoidance, consistent with shareholders providing equity risk incentives for 
managers to undertake risky tax avoidance activity.
10
 If investors perceive tax avoidance as 
risk taking activity that has a positive net present value, this can increase the expected future 
cash flows of the firm and hence reduce the cost of equity.  
Based on the above discussions that tax avoidance can potentially increase or decrease 
the firm’s cost of equity, how investors perceive tax avoidance is ultimately an empirical 
question (see Figure 1 for a diagram that exhibit this relationship). While prior studies have 
examined this issue, they focus on the more aggressive and more risky form of tax avoidance. 
For instance, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that the market reacts negatively to news about 
a firm’s involvement in tax sheltering, which represents an extremely aggressive form of tax 
avoidance
11
, while Wilson (2009) finds that tax shelter firms are associated with higher future 
stock returns when corporate governance is strong.
12
 In addition, existing studies also 
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 Option vega measures the change in value of a manager’s equity portfolio in response to a given change in 
stock return volatility and hence this measure provides an estimate of the payoff to managers for increasing firm 
risk. 
11
 They find some limited evidence for cross-sectional variation in the reaction. For example, the stock price 
decline is smaller for firms that have good governance which is consistent with the idea that for these firms, the 
news is less likely to trigger concerns about insiders’ self-dealing toward the investors themselves. 
12
 Gallemore et al. (2012) also find that firms and their top executives do not appear to bear significant 
reputational costs from engaging in tax sheltering, which supports the view that equity investors do not view tax 
sheltering negatively. 
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examine investors’ perception of another risky and aggressive form of tax avoidance—the 
total amount of tax reserves disclosed under FIN 48. Koester (2011) finds that equity 
investors value uncertain tax avoidance under FIN 48 positively on average. In contrast, 
Hutchens and Rego (2012) find that uncertain tax positions associated with a higher cost of 
capital, which suggests that investors require a higher rate of return for the risky tax position. 
Overall, while prior studies have examined how equity investors perceive aggressive tax 
sheltering and risky tax position and the results are inconclusive, there is limited research on 
how investors perceive less aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance.
13
  
Given the Lambert et al. (2007) model, we expect that more aggressive forms of tax 
avoidance are likely to result in increased opacity of the financial statements, possible 
increased agency concerns, and increased compliance and reputation risks while also saving 
taxes. Thus it is not clear which effect, the direct or indirect effect under the Lambert et al. 
model, will dominate for aggressive tax avoidance activities and this might explain the prior 
inconclusive evidence on how equity investors view aggressive tax avoidance. However, less 
aggressive and less risky tax avoidance activities are less likely to result in opaque financial 
statements, agency problems and compliance and reputation risks such that the indirect effect 
in the Lambert et al. model of increased after-tax cash flows is likely to dominate the direct 
effects resulting in a prediction that greater tax avoidance arising from less aggressive forms 
will result in lower cost of equity. We test this latter prediction and explore how investors 
perceive the less aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance, hereafter simply referred 
to as tax avoidance. Consequently, we test the following directional hypothesis: 
 H1: Ceteris paribus, firms’ tax avoidance is negatively associated with the cost of equity 
capital. 
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 Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find no significant relation between tax avoidance and Tobin’s q, and only a 
positive relation between tax avoidance and Tobin’s q in firms with high levels of institutional ownership. 
However, they do not examine whether tax avoidance affects a firm’s cost of capital. 
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2.3 Cross-sectional Analyses 
2.3.1 Effect of outside monitoring 
 In the cross-section of firms, we expect the cost of equity to vary with tax avoidance 
for firms with different characteristics, conditional on whether these characteristics 
strengthen or mitigate the relationship between tax avoidance and the cost of equity. As 
highlighted in the earlier section, the net benefits or costs accruing to the firm from tax 
avoidance are contingent on whether the tax savings are put to more productive uses or 
diverted to the manager for his private consumption (or used to mask managerial rent 
extraction). Outside monitoring is likely to reduce self-dealing of these tax savings by 
managers. Consistent with this argument, Chen et al. (2010) find that outside monitoring 
mitigates managerial rent extraction, and family firms with effective outside monitoring 
exhibit more tax avoidance than otherwise. Desai et al. (2007) also find that increases in 
corporate tax rates are associated with increases in corporate tax revenue only in countries 
with strong governance, suggesting that managers are able to divert less with more effective 
monitoring. Therefore, if tax avoidance is negatively associated with the cost of equity, we 
expect this effect to be stronger for firms with more effective outside monitoring. Our next 
hypothesis is presented as follows: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between firms’ tax avoidance and the cost of 
equity capital is stronger for firms that have better outside monitoring. 
2.3.2 Effect of marginal benefits from tax savings 
 The marginal benefit of tax avoidance to shareholders likely depends on the use of the 
marginal dollar saved from taxes. Firms with financial constraints face difficulty in obtaining 
sufficient financing to fund investments when profitable opportunities arise. As such, the 
marginal benefit of a dollar of tax saved is likely to be higher for these firms. Consistent with 
this reasoning, Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that the value of cash holdings is higher for 
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financial constrained firms because it allows constrained firms to increase investment and 
also from the fact that the marginal investment is more strongly related to firm value for 
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. In a similar vein, firms with higher sales 
growth are likely to benefit more from the marginal dollar saved from paying tax as it allows 
them to fund their growth opportunities. Therefore, if we expect the cost of equity to be lower 
for firms with relatively higher levels of tax avoidance, this effect should be stronger for 
these firms with greater financial constraints and growth opportunities since the marginal 
benefit of tax avoidance to shareholders in these circumstances are higher. Our hypothesis is 
presented as follows: 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between firms’ tax avoidance and the cost of 
equity capital is stronger for firms that accrue higher marginal benefits from tax savings than 
for other firms. 
2.3.3 Effect of information quality 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that tax avoidance is associated with greater 
opacity which facilitates managerial rent diversion. Consistent with this, Frank et al. (2009) 
find that tax avoidance is associated with financial reporting aggressiveness, which 
presumably increases opaqueness. In a similar vein, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) report that tax 
avoidance can increase the opacity of a firm’s information environment. Hence for firms with 
poor information quality, managers could engage in tax avoidance behavior to increase 
opacity in order to mask their rent extraction from capital market participants. Rational 
investors may thus perceive tax planning activities negatively for firms with poor information 
quality as managers have greater ability to extract rents in such an environment. Therefore, if 
the cost of equity is lower for firms with relatively higher levels of tax avoidance, this effect 
should be weaker for these firms with poorer information quality. Our last hypothesis is 
presented as follows: 
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H2c: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between firms’ tax avoidance and the cost of 
equity capital is weaker for firms with poorer information quality than for other firms. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Measure of cost of equity capital 
 Following prior studies, our measure of ex-ante cost of equity capital is based on the 
discount rate that the market applies to a firm’s future cash flow to determine the current 
stock price (e.g. Easton 2004; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Easton and Monahan 2005). 
Because we cannot directly observe the market’s expectation of a firm’s future cash flow, we 
rely on analysts’ expectations of future earnings as a proxy for market’s expectations. Prior 
literature proposes a number of valuation models to derive the implied cost of equity (see 
Botosan and Plumlee 2005 and Botosan et al. 2011 for a comprehensive review of the 
models). These different models differ in their assumption of short-term and long-term 
growth rates, the explicit forecasting horizon and whether and how inflation is incorporated 
into the steady-state terminal value. Our main measure is based on Easton (2004), where the 
cost of equity capital (R_PEG) is defined as: 
      √
         
  
 
where eps2 (eps1) refers to analysts’ forecast of two-year (one-year) ahead earnings and P0 
refers to current stock price.
14
 
We choose this measure for two important reasons. First, using Value Line analysts 
forecast data, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) suggest that this measure performs well as a proxy 
of cost of equity relative to other measures used in prior literature.
15
 Second, this measure 
imposes minimal data restriction and does not require an estimate of analysts’ forecasts of 
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 This measure restricts our sample to firms where eps2 is greater than eps1. 
15
 In particular, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) find that R_PEG is associated with various proxies for firm-risk 
and is stable across alternative specifications. 
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long-term earnings and stock price. Therefore, it allows us to conduct a large-sample study 
using I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecasts data as compared to using a much smaller restricted 
sample using Value Line data.  In sensitivity tests, we follow Botosan and Plumlee (2005) 
and test our main hypotheses using two alternative measures on a smaller sample based on 
Value Line data, and an average ex-ante cost of equity measure based on the valuation 
models derived from Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004). Our main inferences are unchanged using these three 
alternative measures (see section 5.1). 
3.2 Measures of tax avoidance 
 As mentioned earlier, our study aims to explore how investors perceive the less 
aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance. Based on Lisowsky et al. (2012), we focus 
on three measures: book-tax differences, permanent book-tax difference, and long-run cash 
effective tax rates. Using three measures increases the robustness of our results and mitigates 
concerns that our measure of tax avoidance is merely capturing some omitted firm-level 
characteristic that is unrelated to tax avoidance but related to the cost of equity capital. It is 
also important to note that all three measures capture non-conforming tax avoidance (i.e., tax 
planning strategies that result in different income reported for financial and tax reporting 
purposes).  
 Our first measure book-tax differences (BTD) is defined as the total difference 
between book and taxable income: 
 BTD = PI – (TXFED + TXFO)/STR 
where PI refers to pretax income, TXFED refers to current federal tax expense, TXFO refers 
to current foreign tax expense and STR refers to the statutory tax rate. For cross-sectional 
aggregation purposes, BTD is scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Book-tax differences capture both permanent differences (e.g. book income that is 
non-taxable such as tax credits) as well as temporary differences (e.g. book income that is 
deferred to be taxed in future periods such as favorable tax treatment for depreciation). Prior 
literature is divided with respect to whether permanent or temporary differences better 
capture tax avoidance behavior (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Thus we utilize permanent 
book-tax difference (PBTD) as our second measure for tax avoidance. PBTD is computed as 
total book-tax differences (BTD) less temporary book-tax-differences (TXDI/STR), where 
TXDI is total deferred tax expense and STR is statutory marginal tax rate. Our third measure 
is the long-run cash effective tax rate (CETR), which is defined similarly to Dyreng et al. 
(2008): 
CETR = -1 × [Five-year sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD)/(five-year sum of pretax income (PI) 
less special items (SPI))] 
Using an effective tax rate measure over a five-year long horizon avoids annual volatility in 
effective tax rates, and mitigates concerns about earnings management through accruals 
because accruals are likely to reverse over the long run. Using a cash-based effective tax rate 
measure also avoids tax accrual effects present in the current tax expense. For ease of 
interpretation we multiply the five-year cash-based effective tax rate by minus 1 so that this 
measure is increasing in tax avoidance. 
 
3.3 Empirical models 
3.3.1 Main Analysis 
To test H1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
R_PEGit+1 = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit             (1) 
where R_PEG refers to the measure of cost of equity capital, TAX refers to the measure of tax 
avoidance (BTD, PBTD, or CETR), FIRM_CONTROLS refers to a vector of firm-level 
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controls and YEAR_FE and IND_FE refer to time and industry fixed-effects respectively. We 
measure R_PEG at time t+1 to ensure that investors have access to information relating to the 
firm’s tax avoidance activities before determining their expected returns. The control 
variables are measured contemporaneously with TAX. Because we conduct our hypothesis 
testing on a pooled sample, we cluster the standard errors by firm and include time fixed-
effects in our regressions (Petersen 2009).
16
 Table 1 includes the detailed definition of all 
variables. 
We select FIRM_CONTROLS that are documented in prior literature to be associated 
with the cost of equity capital (e.g., Fama and French 1992, 1993; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; 
Armstrong et al. 2011). We include beta (BETA) because standard capital asset pricing 
models view beta as the sole determinant of the cost of equity capital. Firm size (SIZE) and 
book-to-market ratio (BM) are included to control for the empirical measurement error in 
BETA. We use the leverage ratio (LEV) to control for firm’s capital structure, and bid-ask 
spread (SPREAD) to control for information asymmetry that is associated with the cost of 
capital. Finally, we include stock returns (RET) and stock returns volatility (RETVOL) to 
control for momentum effects and idiosyncratic risks that are known to affect the cost of 
equity. We expect negative associations between cost of equity and size, and between cost of 
equity and stock returns. We expect positive associations between cost of equity and other 
risk factors (BETA, BM, LEV, SPREAD and RETVOL).  
3.3.2 Cross-sectional analyses 
 To test H2, we modify equation (1) to include the conditioning variable 
(Conditional_VAR) and the interaction between TAX and Conditional_VAR: 
R_PEGit+1 = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit +γConditional_VARit  
                                                          
16
 Petersen (2009) suggests that, in the presence of cross-sectional and time-series dependence, one dependence 
effect can be addressed parametrically (e.g., including time dummies for cross-sectional dependence) and then 
standard errors clustered on the other dependence effect (e.g., clustering by firms for time-series dependence) 
can be estimated.  As we have more firm than year observations, we use year dummies and cluster by firms 
because a larger number of clusters lead to standard errors that are less biased. 
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+ ηTAXit × Conditional_VARit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit               (2) 
 In H2a, we examine the moderating effect of outside monitoring on the relation 
between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We measure the extent of outside monitoring using 
two proxies. The first proxy is analyst following (ANALYST) because prior work suggests that 
analysts serve as external monitors to the firm and provide additional scrutiny over managers’ 
actions (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). Yu (2008) finds that firms followed by more 
analysts are associated with lower earnings management. Dyck et al. (2010) also document 
that analysts play a role in detecting corporate fraud. Therefore, we expect firms with greater 
analysts following to have more effective outside monitoring. The second proxy is the 
percentage of shares held by dedicated institutional investors (DEDHELD), where dedicated 
institutional investors are defined according to Bushee (1998) and used in Atkins et al. 
(2012).
17
 Prior work suggests that dedicated institutional investors are long-term oriented, 
often hold large stakes in the firm and hence are likely to be more effective monitors (e.g. 
Bushee 1998; Chen et al. 2007). Therefore, we expect firms with greater percentage of shares 
held by dedicated institutions to have more effective outside monitoring. Based on H2a, we 
expect η to be negative in equation (2). 
 In H2b, we examine the moderating effect of marginal benefits from tax savings on 
the relation between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We estimate the marginal benefits 
from tax savings using two proxies. The first proxy is sales growth (SG), and we expect firms 
with greater sales growth to enjoy greater marginal benefits from tax savings because the 
cash saved from taxes can be used to fund the growth opportunities. The second proxy is a 
measure of financial constraints based on the KZ index (DKZ), which is a linear combination 
of five accounting ratios constructed by Lamont et al. (2001) based on the results in Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997). Prior work in finance often uses the KZ index as a proxy for financial 
                                                          
17
 We thank the authors for sharing the data on institutional classification with us. 
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constraints. We expect firms with greater financial constraints to enjoy greater marginal 
benefits from tax savings because the cash saved from taxes can be utilized to relieve 
financial constraints and to fund profitable investment opportunities. Based on H2b, we 
expect η to be negative in equation (2). 
 Finally in H2c, we examine the moderating effect of information quality on the 
relation between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We measure the quality of financial 
reporting using three measures. The first measure is the natural log of the absolute value of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, as used in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). The second 
measure is accrual quality based on Dechow and Dichev (2002). The third measure is tax 
accrual quality based on Choudhary et al. (2012). All three measures capture the quality of 
the accruals estimation process, which could be affected by the firm’s underlying economic 
determinants, the measurement error in the accounting system and/or earnings management. 
Poorer quality of accruals negatively affects the quality of external financial reporting and 
hence leads to lower corporate transparency. We expect investors to perceive tax avoidance 
negatively for firms with poor information quality because they expect such an environment 
to facilitate rent-seeking by managers. Hence, based on H2c, we expect η to be positive in 
equation (2). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample 
The sample period for the current study spans from 1993-2010.
18
 We collect our data 
primarily from I/B/E/S, Compustat, and CRSP in computing the cost of equity capital, tax 
avoidance, the hypothesized intervening variables and the control variables used in the 
regression analysis. We exclude firms in the financial industries (i.e., SIC codes 6000 to 
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 Our sample begins in 1993 to coincide with the implementation of FAS 109 (now codified in ASC 740) to 
ensure consistent financial reporting for income taxes over the sample period.  
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6999). The sample size varies for each test because of the specific measure used in the test. 
For example, sample size is typically larger when tax avoidance is measured by total book-
tax-difference (BTD) or permanent book-tax differences (PBTD), compared to long-run cash 
effective tax rates (CETR) because of the more stringent requirement to compute the latter 
variable. Similarly, models using sales growth (SG) and financial constraints (DKZ) as the 
intervening variables have relatively larger sample size compared to models using analyst 
coverage (ANALYST) or dedicated institutional ownership (DEDHELD), because these latter 
variables are available only for larger firms. We also truncate each continuous variable at the 
1% and 99% level to mitigate the effect of outliers. The final sample size used in the 
regression analyses ranges from 24,539 to 34,652 firm-year observations for the 18-year 
sample period. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. The mean and median 
cost of equity (R_PEG) is 11.5% and 10.2% respectively. The mean and median cost of 
equity in our sample is comparable to that reported in prior studies (e.g. Botosan et al. 2011). 
The mean (median) total book-tax difference (BTD) is 0.013 (0.016), which is comparable to 
that reported in another large sample study by Frank et al. (2009). The mean (median) 
permanent book-tax difference (PBTD) is 0.012 (0.007), and the mean (median) five-year 
cash effective tax rate is 34.7% (29.7%).
19
  Recall that CETR is multiplied by -1 so that all 
three tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation table of the variables in our paper. The three 
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 The mean and median five-year cash effective tax rate in our sample is higher than that reported in Dyreng et 
al. (2008) who reported a mean and median five-year cash effective tax rate of 29.1% and 27.7% respectively. 
The difference is likely due to Dyreng et al.’s (2008) sample of larger firms that survived at least ten years to 
compute their measure of ten-year cash effective tax rate. Dyreng et al. (2008) also reported that the larger firms 
in their sample are associated with a lower cash effective tax rate, which potentially explains the lower mean 
and median five-year cash effective tax rate in their sample as compared to ours. 
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measures of tax avoidance (BTD, PBTD, and CETR) are positively correlated with one 
another, which suggest that all three measures capture tax planning activities in general. 
However, the correlation among the three measures are not extremely high (between 0.11 to 
0.65), which suggests that each measure likely captures different dimensions of tax avoidance 
and hence supports our choice of using all three measures in our analyses to triangulate our 
results and  increase the robustness of our findings.   
The correlation between cost of equity (R_PEG) and all three measures of tax 
avoidance (BTD, PBTD, and CETR) are significantly negative, which suggests that tax 
avoidance is associated with a lower cost of equity. The correlation between cost of equity 
and other control variables is also largely consistent with prior literature. In particular, 
R_PEG is positively correlated with beta (BETA), book-to market (BM), leverage (LEV), bid-
ask spreads (SPREAD) and stock return volatility (RETVOL), and is negatively correlated 
with firm size (SIZE) and stock returns (RET). Because these are pairwise univariate 
correlations, we defer the main analyses to multivariate tests in section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Main analysis – Test of H1 
 In this section, we report our results for the test of H1 which examines the association 
between tax avoidance and cost of equity. As shown in Table 4, all three of our measures of 
tax avoidance are highly and significantly associated with a lower cost of equity capital (t-
statistic = -3.80, -3.96, and -4.96 for BTD, PBTD, and CETR, respectively). The effect of tax 
avoidance on cost of equity is also economically significant. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in book-tax difference (BTD), permanent book-tax difference (PBTD), and 
cash-based effective tax rate (CETR) is associated with a 31 basis points, 22 basis points, and 
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19 basis points decrease in the cost of equity, respectively.
20
  
 The coefficients on the other control variables are significant and consistent with prior 
literature. In particular, we find that firms with higher beta (BETA), higher book-to-market 
(BM), higher leverage (LEV), higher bid-ask spread (SPREAD), and higher idiosyncratic risks 
(RETVOL) are associated with a higher cost of equity while larger firms (SIZE) and firms 
with higher stock returns (RET) are associated with a lower cost of equity. 
 Overall, the results suggest that investors perceive tax avoidance positively and 
reward tax-avoiding firms with a lower cost of equity.
21
 
 
4.4 Cross-sectional analyses – Test of H2 
 In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the relation between tax 
avoidance and cost of equity. In H2a, we examine the moderating role of outside monitoring. 
In particular, we argue that stronger outside monitoring reduces diversion of tax savings to 
managers’ private consumption or rent extraction masked by tax avoidance and hence 
investors should perceive tax planning more positively for tax-avoiding firms with better 
outside monitoring. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. In Panel A, we use 
analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a proxy for the extent of outside monitoring. Consistent with 
our prediction in H2a, we find that the cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms with 
greater analyst following (t-statistic = -4.34, -3.00, and -1.96 for BTD × ANALYST, PBTD × 
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 The impact of a one standard deviation increase in total book-tax difference (BTD) on the cost of equity 
(R_PEG) is computed as -0.027 (coefficient on BTD) × 0.113 (the sample standard deviation of BTD) = -0.31%. 
The other comparative statics are computed analogously. 
21
 Guenther et al. (2012) find that volatility in cash effective tax rate is positively associated with firm risk 
proxied by stock returns volatility. They suggest that the level of cash effective tax rate (CETR) does not capture 
tax riskiness or firm risk. Guenther et al. (2012) document that the profile for low CETR tend to be more capital 
intensive, rely more on R&D, and hence likely benefit more from tax shields (thus firm risk is not necessarily 
higher). If so, we would expect firms with low CETR to have lower risk and cost of equity. We find evidence 
consistent with this expectation. On the other hand, Guenther et al. (2012) show that high CETR volatility firms 
are generally smaller, less capital intensive, with smaller tax benefits from the exercise of stock options. These 
firms are more risky and hence have greater future stock returns volatility. As a robustness check, we include 
the volatility of CETR in our regressions, and find that our main findings still hold (i.e., tax avoidance firms 
have lower cost of equity after controlling for the volatility of CETR). 
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ANALYST, and CETR × ANALYST respectively). In Panel B, we use the percentage of 
dedicated institutional ownership (DEDHELD) as a proxy for the extent of outside 
monitoring. Again consistent with H2a, we find that the cost of equity is lower for tax-
avoiding firms with greater dedicated institutional ownership (t-statistic = -2.32, -2.56, and -
2.16 for BTD × DEDHELD, PBTD × DEDHELD, and CETR × DEDHELD respectively). We 
also find that the coefficients of ANALYST and DEDHELD are negative and mostly 
significant, which suggests that better outside monitoring is associated with a lower cost of 
equity. In sum, the results in Table 5 are consistent with hypothesis H2a which suggests that 
investors perceive tax planning more positively for tax-avoiding firms with better outside 
monitoring as better outside monitoring likely mitigates managerial rent-diversion associated 
with tax avoidance. 
 In H2b, we examine the moderating role of marginal benefits of tax savings and 
predict that investors perceive tax planning more positively for tax-avoiding firms which 
likely realize more benefits from a marginal dollar saved from taxes. Table 6 reports the 
results of our analyses. In Table 6 Panel A, we use sales growth (SG) as a proxy for the 
marginal benefits for tax savings and we expect firms with higher sales growth to realize 
greater benefits from a marginal dollar saved because these tax savings can be used to fund 
firm growth. The results are consistent with our prediction H2b. In particular, we find that the 
cost of equity is lower for tax avoiding firms with greater sales growth (t-statistic = -1.98, -
1.99, and -2.68 for BTD × SG, PBTD × SG, and CETR × SG respectively). In panel B, we use 
the KZ Index (DKZ) as a proxy for the marginal benefits for tax savings and we expect firms 
with greater financial constraints to benefit more from incremental tax savings as these 
savings can be used to fund profitable investment opportunities that they could not have 
afforded otherwise. Consistent with H2b, we find some evidence that the cost of equity is 
lower for tax-avoiding firms with greater financial constraints (t-statistic = -3.95, -1.87 and -
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1.35 for BTD × DKZ, PBTD × DKZ, and CETR × DKZ respectively). Overall, the results in 
Table 6 are consistent with our prediction in H2b which suggests that investors recognize 
how tax savings can be redeployed to more productive uses and hence reward tax-avoiding 
firms with higher marginal benefits from tax savings with a lower cost of equity. 
 Finally in H2c, we examine the moderating role of information quality. In this 
hypothesis, we argue that poor information quality enhances managers’ ability to use tax 
avoidance to obfuscate rent-seeking activities for their own self-interests and hence investors 
perceive tax planning more negatively for tax-avoiding firms with poor information quality. 
We measure the information quality of the firm using its financial reporting quality. The 
results of our tests are presented in Table 7. In panel A, we use the magnitude of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (APDAC) as a proxy for information quality. 
Consistent with H2c, we find that the cost of equity is higher for tax-avoiding firms with 
higher magnitude of discretionary accruals (t-statistic = 6.00, 3.82, and 2.01 for BTD × 
APDAC, PBTD × APDAC, and CETR × APDAC respectively). In panel B, we use accrual 
quality based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) as a proxy for information quality. Again 
consistent with H2c, we find that the cost of equity is higher for tax-avoiding firms with 
poorer accrual quality (t-statistic = 2.58, 2.06, and 1.91 for BTD × AQ, PBTD × AQ, and 
CETR × AQ respectively). Finally in Panel C, we use tax accrual quality based on Choudhary 
et al. (2012) as a proxy for information quality. The results are also consistent with H2c and 
we find that the cost of equity is higher for tax-avoiding firms with poor tax accrual quality 
(t-statistic = 3.13, 2.56, and 3.01 for BTD × TAXAQ, PBTD × TAXAQ, and CETR × TAXAQ 
respectively). The coefficients for APDAC, AQ and TAXAQ are all positive and significant, 
suggesting that poor information quality is associated with a higher cost of equity, consistent 
with the theoretical prediction of Lambert et al. (2007). The results from Table 7 suggest that 
investors perceive tax planning less positively for firms with poor information quality as 
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investors deduce managers have greater ability to divert tax savings to their own private 
benefits when the information quality is poor. 
 Overall in this section, we find results consistent with our hypotheses that the cost of 
equity is lower for tax avoidance firms with better outside monitoring, firms that likely 
realize greater marginal benefits from tax savings, and firms with higher information quality. 
 
5. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
5.1 Using Alternative Measures of Cost of Equity Capital 
 In this section, we test the robustness of our results using three alternative measures of 
cost of equity capital. The first two alternative measures are proposed by Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) and Botosan et al. (2011). Both papers assess the empirical validity of various 
proxies of cost of equity utilized in extant literature using Value Line data and they 
recommend two measures, VL_PEG and VL_DIV as appropriate measures because these 
measures correlate consistently and predictably with various known proxies for risk. We 
follow Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan et al. (2011) and use these two measures to 
test our hypotheses on a restricted sample of firms where Value Line coverage is available 
from 1993-2005. The exact measurement of VL_PEG and VL_DIV is described in greater 
detail in Table 1.
22
 For the third alternative measure, we use an average ex-ante cost of equity 
measure based on the valuation models from Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004). This average measure has 
been used extensively in the literature (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2007). 
 We present the results in Table 8 for the main analysis using these alternative 
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 Our main measure of cost of equity R_PEG and the alternative measure VL_PEG are both based on Easton 
(2004). The main difference is that R_PEG is estimated based on one and two-year ahead forecast of earnings 
whereas VL_PEG is based on four and five-year ahead forecast of earnings. Because four and five-year ahead 
earnings forecasts are not often provided in the I/B/E/S database, we do not use this measure using I/B/E/S data. 
We also do not use VL_DIV on I/B/E/S data because this measure requires analysts’ estimate of five-year ahead 
stock price which I/B/E/S does not provide. 
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measures but we do not tabulate the results for the cross-sectional analyses for the sake of 
brevity. Panels A and B report results for cost of equity estimated from Value Line
23
, while 
Panel C reports results for the average cost of equity measure. The results indicate that tax 
avoidance is negatively and significantly associated with all three alternative proxies for cost 
of equity. In cross-sectional analyses, we repeat all our tests for H2 using these three 
alternative measures. The untabulated results show that most coefficients of interest (i.e., the 
interaction terms) are significant at 10% or better and in the same direction as our 
predictions.
24
 Overall, the results in this section suggest that the inferences from our earlier 
analyses remain unchanged using these three alternative measures of cost of equity. 
 
5.2 Using Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance 
5.2.1 Alternative measures for less aggressive form of tax avoidance  
To triangulate our results, we repeat our analyses using two other measures that 
capture less aggressive forms of tax avoidance. The first measure, ETR1, reflects the 
traditional GAAP effective tax rate with total tax expense divided by pretax book income. 
The second measure, ETR2, is based on Zimmerman (1983), computed as ((Total tax expense 
– Change in deferred tax) / Operating cash flows). We report the findings in the first two 
columns of Table 9. The results indicate that both alternative measures of tax avoidance 
(ETR1 and ETR2) are negatively and significantly associated with cost of equity capital. 
These results are consistent with our analysis using BTD, PBTD, and CETR as our main 
measures of tax avoidance.  
5.2.2 Measures that capture extremely aggressive form of tax avoidance 
Accordingly to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), tax shelter activities represent the most 
extreme and aggressive form of tax avoidance. In addition, Lisowsky et al. (2012) find that a 
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 Note that this restricted sample is about a third of our main sample using I/B/E/S data and sample size ranges 
from 8,703 to 11,086 firm-year observations. 
24
 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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firm’s reserve for income taxes disclosed pursuant to FIN 48 reflects corporate tax shelter 
activities. Consistent with tax reserve capturing more aggressive forms of tax avoidance, 
Hutchens and Rego (2012) find a positive association between the level of a firm’s tax 
reserve and the cost of equity capital. Hence, we examine the sensitivity of our results using 
these two more aggressive measures of tax avoidance—the tax shelter prediction score 
(SHELTER) developed by Wilson (2009) and uncertain tax benefits (UTB) disclosed by the 
firm pursuant to FIN 48. The last two columns of Table 9 show that the coefficient on 
SHELTER is negative but not statistically significant, while the coefficient on UTB is positive 
and significant. Taken together, these results indicate that our main finding of a negative 
association between corporate tax avoidance and cost of equity does not hold for the more 
extreme and more aggressive form of tax avoidance, consistent with our analysis of the 
Lambert et al. model that the direct effects become more salient when studying tax aggressive 
forms of tax planning. 
 
5.3 Change Analyses 
 To mitigate the concern that an omitted correlated variable is driving our results, we 
utilize a change regression specification for our main analyses in an additional sensitivity test. 
In particular, we regress the change in the cost of equity on the change in tax avoidance and 
other control variables, and assume that the endogeneity resulting from the omitted correlated 
variable is stationary over time. The results are presented in Table 10. Consistent with our 
earlier analyses, we find that an increase in tax avoidance (ΔTAX) is associated significantly 
with a decrease in the cost of equity (ΔR_PEG). Overall, results from the change analyses 
strengthen our main conclusion that tax avoidance is associated with a lower cost of equity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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 Based on the model developed by Lambert et al. (2007), we generate a testable 
hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a firm’s cost of equity capital. Tax avoidance can be 
associated with a higher cost of equity both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs 
when investors perceive tax avoidance negatively as tax planning usually involves complex 
transactions that increases firm opacity and thus leads to a higher cost of equity. The indirect 
effect occurs when investors perceive managers to engage in more opportunistic rent-seeking 
because tax planning allows managers to obfuscate their self-dealing behavior and hence 
investors expect greater misappropriation and demand a higher cost of equity for tax-avoiding 
firms. On the other hand, tax avoidance can be associated with a lower cost of equity because 
cash savings from taxes can be redeployed to more productive uses (hence improving a firm’s 
operating and investment decisions) and risk-neutral investors would prefer risk-averse 
managers to engage in risky tax planning activities that have positive net present value. 
Hence investors expect higher future cash flows for tax-avoiding firms and demand a lower 
cost of equity. 
 Given the Lambert et al. (2007) model, we expect that more aggressive forms of tax 
avoidance are likely to result in increased opacity of the financial statements, possible 
increased agency concerns, and increased compliance and reputation risks while also saving 
taxes. Thus it is not clear which effect, the direct or indirect effect under the Lambert et al. 
model, will dominate for aggressive tax avoidance activities and this might explain the prior 
inconclusive evidence on how equity investors view aggressive tax avoidance. In contrast, 
less aggressive and less risky tax avoidance activities are less likely to result in opaque 
financial statements, agency problems and compliance and reputation risks such that the 
indirect effect in the Lambert et al. model of increased after-tax cash flows is likely to 
dominate the direct effects resulting in a prediction that greater tax avoidance arising from 
less aggressive forms will result in lower cost of equity. We test this latter prediction and 
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explore how investors perceive the less aggressive and less risky forms of tax avoidance,  
We find that investors perceive tax planning activities positively in our large sample 
of firms from 1993-2010. In particular, we utilize three measures of tax avoidance that 
capture generally less aggressive forms of tax planning to test our hypothesis and find that the 
cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms. The effect is also economically significant. A 
one standard deviation increase in our measure of tax avoidance is associated with a 19 to 31 
basis points reduction in the cost of equity. To corroborate our findings, we examine cross-
sectional variation where we expect the cost of equity to be different for subsample of firms. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find investors perceive tax planning more positively for 
firms with outside monitoring and for firms that likely realize higher marginal benefits from 
tax savings. We also find that investors discount the value of tax planning for firms with poor 
information quality. In addition, our results are robust to using three alternative measures of 
cost of equity, two alternative measures of tax avoidance, and using a change specification. 
 This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. It is the first large-
sample study that directly examines how investors perceive relatively less aggressive forms 
of corporate tax avoidance. Earlier papers examine how investors perceive extreme forms of 
tax avoidance behavior such as tax sheltering and uncertain tax positions and the results are 
inconclusive (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009, Wilson 2009; Gallemore et al. 2012; Koester 2011; 
Hutchens and Rego 2012). However, tax sheltering and uncertain tax positions are extremely 
aggressive tax planning activity and hence these prior studies examining market response to 
these activities may not be generalizable to other tax planning activities. Hence, our study 
extends prior literature by documenting how investors perceive less extreme forms of tax 
planning. The finding that tax avoidance is associated with a lower cost of equity suggests 
that tax planning is a value-enhancing activity that investors appreciate in general. The results 
of this paper also potentially explain why many large US corporations engage in tax planning 
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and why corporations provide incentives for managers to engage in tax planning (Robinson et 
al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012). Also consistent with Blaylock (2011), our results suggest 
that tax planning in the US does not constitute large scale managerial rent-seeking on 
average.  
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Figure 1: The relationship between tax avoidance and cost of equity 
 
  
Direct Effect (+) 
Tax Avoidance Cost of Equity 
Indirect Effect (+/-) 
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
R_PEG = Measure of cost of equity, based on Easton (2004): 
      √
         
  
 
where eps2 (eps1) refers to analysts’ forecast of two-year (one-year) 
ahead earnings and P0 refers to current stock price. Inputs are 
obtained from I/B/E/S summary statistics and prices file and 
measured at the end of the fiscal year following Easton and Monahan 
(2005). 
VL_PEG = Measure of cost of equity, based on Botosan and Plumlee (2005): 
       √
         
  
 
where eps5 (eps4) refers to analysts’ forecast of five-year (four-year) 
ahead earnings and P0 refers to current stock price. Forecasts are 
obtained from Value Line, current stock prices obtained from CRSP 
and measured at the end of the fiscal year following Easton and 
Monahan (2005). 
VL_DIV = Measure of cost of equity, based on Botosan and Plumlee (2005): 
   ∑(       )
  (    )  
 
   
(       )
  (  ) 
where P0 refers to current stock price, dpst refers to analysts’ forecast 
of time t dividends and P5 refers to analysts’ forecast of long-term 
stock price. Forecasts are obtained from Value Line, current stock 
prices obtained from CRSP and measured at the end of the fiscal year 
following Easton and Monahan (2005). 
MAVG_R = An average ex-ante cost of equity measure based on the valuation 
models derived from Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004). 
Details provided in Dhaliwal et al. ( 2007). 
BTD = Total book-to-tax differences which is computed as PI – (TXFED + 
TXFO/)STR, where PI refers to pretax income, TXFED refers to 
current federal tax expense, TXFO refers to current foreign tax 
expense and STR refers to the statutory tax rate. 
PBTD = Total book-tax differences (BTD) less temporary book-tax-
differences (TXDI/STR), where TXDI is total deferred tax expense 
and STR is statutory marginal tax rate. 
CETR = Five-year cumulative cash effective tax rate as in Dyreng et al. 
(2008), computed as the five-year sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) 
dividend by five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less  special item 
(SPI). The variable is multiplied by negative one so that it is 
increasing in tax avoidance. 
ETR1 = Total tax expense divided by Pre-tax income. The variable is 
multiplied by negative one so that it is increasing in tax avoidance. 
ETR2 
 
= 
 
(Total tax expense  – Change in deferred tax)/Operating cash 
flows. Based on Zimmerman (1983). The variable is multiplied by 
negative one so that it is increasing in tax avoidance. 
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SG 
 
= 
 
The percentage change in sales (scaled by total assets) over the 
previous year.  
SHELTER = 
 
The tax shelter prediction score developed by Wilson (2009), 
computed as: 
SHELTER = -4.86 + 5.20 * BTD + 4.08 * DAC - 1.41 * LEV + 0.76* 
Size + 3.51 * ROA  + 1.72 * Foreign_Income + 2.43 * R&D,  
where BTD is book income less taxable income scaled by lagged 
total assets, DAC is the discretionary accruals from the performance-
adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones Model, LEV is long-term 
debt divided by total assets; Size is the log of total assets, ROA is pre-
tax earnings divided by total assets, Foregin_Income is foreign pre-
tax earnings divided by lagged total assets, R&D is research and 
development expenditure divided by lagged total assets. 
UTB = 
 
Ending balance (in millions) of the unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) 
accrual, scaled by lagged total assets. 
DKZ = Indicator variable equals 1 if the KZ index is in the top quartile, 0 
otherwise. KZ index is measured by KZ=-1.002 * CHE/K + 0.283*Q 
+ 3.139 * DEBTCAP - 39.368 * DIV/K - 1.315 * Cash/K; 
where CHE is cash and short term investments; K is lagged plant, 
property and equipment (PPEGT); Q = (AT - CEQ - TXDB + CSHO 
* PRCC_F)/AT; DEBTCAP = (DLC + DLTT) / (DLC + DLTT + 
SEQ); DIV = DVC + DVP; where AT is total assets; CEQ is total 
common equity; TXDB is deferred taxes; CSHO is number of 
common shares outstanding; PRCC_F is price at fiscal year-end; 
DLC is debt in current liabilities; DLTT is long-term debt; SEQ is 
total shareholders’ equity; DVC is common dividends; and DVP is 
preferred dividends. 
APDAC = Discretionary total accruals is first computed based on the cross-
sectional modified Jones (1991) model for all firms recorded in 
Compustat based on 2-digit SIC industry. Following Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), the firms are sorted in each industry into deciles based on the 
prior year’s return on assets (ROA). Performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals are obtained by subtracting from each firm’s abnormal 
accrual the median abnormal accrual from the corresponding ROA 
industry decile to which the firm belongs. The absolute value of the 
accrual measure is log-transformed to correct for the non-normality 
of the measure. 
AQ = Accrual quality as in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by 
McNichols (2002), defined as the standard deviation of the residual 
over t+1 to t+4, where the residual is estimated from the following 
equation by industry (2-digit SIC) and year. 
                                                    
where ΔWC is changes in working capital scaled by average total 
assets, where working capital is Δaccount receivables (RECT)+ 
Δinventory (INVT)- Δaccount payable (AP) - Δtax payable (TXP)+ 
Δother current asset (ACO) - Δother current liabilities. CFO is cash 
flows from operation (OANCF), ΔSALE is changes in sales (SALE) 
scaled by average total assets, PPE is gross PP&E (PPEGT) scaled 
by average total assets.  
TAXAQ = Tax accrual quality as in Choudhary et al. (2012), defined as the 
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standard deviation of the residuals from the regression (TaxACCt = 
β0 + β1CTPt-1 + β2CTPt + β3CTPt+1 + εt), with larger values indicating 
poorer tax accrual quality. TaxACC is the current period income tax 
accrual, defined as the difference between current period tax expense 
(TE) for financial statement purposes and current period tax-related 
cash outflows (CTP).  All variables are scaled by total assets. 
ANALYST = Natural log of number of analysts following a firm. 
DEDHELD 
 
= 
 
Dedicated institutional ownership as defined in Bushee (1998) and 
used in Atkins et al. (2012). 
BETA = Beta estimated from CAPM model over the fiscal year. 
SIZE = Natural log of market capitalization at fiscal year-end. 
BM = Natural log of book-to-market ratio at fiscal year-end. 
LEV = Total debt to asset ratio. 
SPREAD = Roll’s (1984) effective bid-ask spreads over the fiscal year. 
RET = Stock returns over the fiscal year. 
RETVOL = Stock returns volatility over the fiscal year. 
 
41 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
R_PEG 34,652 0.115 0.102 0.080 0.137 0.061 
BTD 34,652 0.013 0.016 -0.009 0.043 0.113 
PBTD 34,652 0.012 0.007 -0.003 0.025 0.116 
CETR 31,150 -0.347 -0.297 -0.377 -0.199 0.465 
SG 32,604 0.116 0.003 -0.079 0.086 18.025 
DKZ 32,552 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.433 
APDAC 33,662 -2.487 -2.313 -3.221 -1.589 1.330 
AQ 30,833 0.044 0.034 0.021 0.055 0.035 
TAXAQ 28,726 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.010 
ANALYST 29,623 1.639 1.792 1.099 2.398 0.957 
DEDHELD 26,205 0.081 0.040 0.000 0.128 0.333 
BETA 34,652 1.128 1.005 0.609 1.507 0.780 
SIZE 34,652 6.671 6.562 5.347 7.870 1.880 
BM 34,652 -0.869 -0.800 -1.267 -0.400 0.730 
LEV 34,652 0.212 0.200 0.041 0.338 0.175 
SPREAD 34,652 0.015 0.009 0.002 0.020 0.020 
RET 34,652 0.226 0.177 -0.058 0.437 0.499 
RETVOL 34,652 0.122 0.106 0.074 0.150 0.074 
The sample period used for the study spans from 1993-2010. The descriptive statistics for all variables 
are based on the largest sample when tax avoidance is measured by BTD. The detailed definitions of 
the variables are provided in Table 1. All continuous variables trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
For the regressions, CETR is multiplied by -1 so that all three tax avoidance measures are increasing 
in tax avoidance. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Table 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) R_PEG 1.00 
 
 
               (2) BTD -0.10 1.00 
 
               (3) PBTD -0.08 0.65 1.00                
(4) CETR -0.09 0.20 0.11 1.00 
              (5) SG 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
              (6) KZ 0.12 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 1.00 
            (7) APDAC 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.11 1.00 
           (8) AQ 0.21 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.17 1.00 
          (9) TAXAQ 0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.15 0.23 1.00 
         (10) ANALYST -0.28 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.06 1.00 
        (11) DEDHELD 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
        (12) BETA 0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.07 -0.01 1.00 
      (13) SIZE -0.40 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.29 -0.13 0.67 0.00 -0.04 1.00 
     (14) BM 0.21 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 -0.30 0.00 -0.10 -0.37 1.00 
    (15) LEV 0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.57 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.19 0.06 0.09 1.00 
   (16) SPREAD 0.31 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.05 0.17 0.01 -0.38 0.05 -0.09 -0.53 0.22 0.08 1.00 
  (17) RET -0.04 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.15 0.05 -0.35 -0.10 -0.02 1.00 
 
(18) RETVOL 0.24 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.29 0.25 -0.17 -0.02 0.41 -0.30 -0.02 -0.12 0.15 0.37 1.00 
This table reports the Pearson’s correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis, based on the largest possible sample. The detailed 
definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. All correlations that are bold are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better (two-tailed). 
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Table 4: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity (H1) 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.151 25.88*** 
 
0.150 25.90*** 
 
0.130 23.04*** 
TAX ? -0.027 -3.80*** 
 
-0.019 -3.96*** 
 
-0.004 -4.96*** 
BETA + 0.003 5.25*** 
 
0.003 5.18*** 
 
0.006 7.66*** 
SIZE - -0.008 -18.55*** 
 
-0.008 -18.59*** 
 
-0.006 -14.56*** 
BM + 0.006 8.00*** 
 
0.006 8.11*** 
 
0.009 11.75*** 
LEV + 0.040 14.59*** 
 
0.040 14.57*** 
 
0.031 12.44*** 
SPREAD + 0.354 4.24*** 
 
0.348 4.21*** 
 
0.299 3.59*** 
RET - -0.009 -10.21*** 
 
-0.009 -10.39*** 
 
-0.007 -7.86*** 
RETVOL + 0.128 11.44*** 
 
0.130 11.60*** 
 
0.124 8.61*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  25.58  25.37  24.14 
N  34,652  34,652  31,150 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity 
capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). The detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 1. Column 1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, 
Column 2 shows the results using PBTD to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results 
using CETR to proxy tax avoidance.  Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama 
and French 48 industries are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Outside Monitoring (H2a) 
Panel A: Analyst coverage 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.147 25.34*** 
 
0.145 25.03*** 
 
0.131 29.88*** 
TAX ? -0.067 -5.00*** 
 
-0.035 -3.68*** 
 
-0.007 -4.21*** 
BETA + 0.004 5.80*** 
 
0.004 5.69*** 
 
0.006 7.80*** 
SIZE - -0.007 -15.63*** 
 
-0.007 -15.45*** 
 
-0.006 -11.83*** 
BM + 0.006 8.36*** 
 
0.006 8.32*** 
 
0.009 12.40*** 
LEV + 0.041 13.94*** 
 
0.041 14.00*** 
 
0.020 7.74*** 
SPREAD + 0.301 3.55*** 
 
0.300 3.52*** 
 
0.305 3.27*** 
RET - -0.009 -9.35*** 
 
-0.009 -9.70*** 
 
-0.007 -7.11*** 
RETVOL + 0.124 9.96*** 
 
0.128 10.16*** 
 
0.138 8.18*** 
ANALYST - -0.004 -5.73*** 
 
0.004 5.62*** 
 
-0.001 -1.01 
TAX*ANALYST - -0.022 -4.34*** 
 
-0.011 -3.00*** 
 
-0.002 -1.96** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  25.52  25.35  20.32 
N  29,623  29,623  27,078 
Panel B: Dedicated institutional ownership 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.132 23.17*** 
 
0.132 21.47*** 
 
0.119 19.01*** 
TAX ? -0.022 -3.84*** 
 
-0.025 -4.39*** 
 
-0.009 -2.57*** 
BETA + 0.003 5.21*** 
 
0.003 4.98*** 
 
0.005 6.39*** 
SIZE - -0.008 -18.68*** 
 
-0.008 -17.33*** 
 
-0.006 -14.46*** 
BM + 0.007 9.22*** 
 
0.006 8.11*** 
 
0.009 11.35*** 
LEV + 0.039 13.94*** 
 
0.042 13.98*** 
 
0.032 11.79*** 
SPREAD + 0.257 3.52*** 
 
0.305 3.50*** 
 
0.263 3.15*** 
RET - -0.006 -6.27*** 
 
-0.007 -7.62*** 
 
-0.006 -6.33*** 
RETVOL + 0.107 8.67*** 
 
0.119 9.29*** 
 
0.113 7.01*** 
DEDHELD - -0.003 2.32** 
 
-0.001 -2.24** 
 
-0.019 -2.23** 
TAX*DEDHELD - -0.118 -2.32** 
 
-0.103 -2.56*** 
 
-0.050 -2.16** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  25.58  25.08  24.86 
N  26,205  26,205  24,539 
This table reports the regression results of the role of outside monitoring on the relation between tax 
avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). 
In Panel A, we report the results when outside monitoring is proxied by analyst coverage. In Panel B, 
we report the results when outside monitoring is proxied by ownership held by dedicated institutions. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. In each Panel, Column 1 shows the 
results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the results using PBTD to proxy tax 
avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax avoidance.  Coefficients on the 
year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries are not tabulated for brevity. The 
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in 
the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity –  
the Role of Marginal Benefits of Tax Savings (H2b) 
Panel A: Sales growth 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.128 52.48*** 
 
0.128 52.40*** 
 
0.135 22.97*** 
TAX ? -0.012 -3.79*** 
 
-0.008 -3.30*** 
 
-0.003 -3.90*** 
BETA + 0.004 9.16*** 
 
0.004 9.13*** 
 
0.005 6.48*** 
SIZE - -0.005 -20.27*** 
 
-0.005 -20.28*** 
 
-0.007 -15.03*** 
BM + 0.005 10.26*** 
 
0.005 10.44*** 
 
0.008 10.64*** 
LEV + 0.011 6.21*** 
 
0.012 6.46*** 
 
0.037 12.53*** 
SPREAD + 0.169 6.11*** 
 
0.160 5.84*** 
 
0.285 3.14*** 
RET - -0.003 -4.61*** 
 
-0.003 -4.75*** 
 
-0.007 -7.53*** 
RETVOL + 0.078 9.48*** 
 
0.079 9.55*** 
 
0.110 7.37*** 
SG ? 0.000 -0.61 
 
0.000 -0.65 
 
-0.015 -5.89*** 
TAX*SG - -0.001 -1.98** 
 
-0.001 -1.99** 
 
-0.007 -2.68*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  16.67  16.67  25.99 
N  32,604  32,604  26,388 
Panel B: KZ index 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.151 25.49*** 
 
0.150 25.23*** 
 
0.120 16.57*** 
TAX ? -0.020 -3.11*** 
 
-0.016 -3.39*** 
 
-0.003 -2.55*** 
BETA + 0.003 5.24*** 
 
0.003 5.18*** 
 
0.007 6.33*** 
SIZE - -0.008 -18.37*** 
 
-0.008 -18.29*** 
 
-0.006 -10.21*** 
BM + 0.006 8.44*** 
 
0.006 8.41*** 
 
0.012 12.33*** 
LEV + 0.030 9.73*** 
 
0.031 9.95*** 
 
0.037 9.31*** 
SPREAD + 0.338 4.10*** 
 
0.336 4.07*** 
 
0.550 5.65*** 
RET - -0.008 -9.38*** 
 
-0.009 -9.62*** 
 
-0.020 -17.40*** 
RETVOL + 0.121 10.65*** 
 
0.125 10.88*** 
 
0.167 9.60*** 
DKZ + 0.007 6.48*** 
 
0.006 5.87*** 
 
0.003 2.07** 
TAX*DKZ - -0.057 -3.95*** 
 
-0.028 -1.87* 
 
-0.003 -1.35 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  25.97  25.65  25.27 
N  32,552  32,552  27,716 
This table reports the regression results of the role of marginal benefits of tax savings on the relation 
between tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity 
capital (R_PEG). In Panel A, we report the results when the marginal benefit of tax savings is proxied 
by sales growth. In Panel B, we report the results when the marginal benefit of tax savings is proxied 
by financial constraints, KZ index. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. In 
each Panel, Column 1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the 
results using PBTD to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax 
avoidance.  Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries 
are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control 
for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Information Quality (H2c) 
Panel A: Performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.156 26.13*** 
 
0.155 25.93*** 
 
0.139 26.88*** 
TAX ? -0.023 -7.73*** 
 
-0.015 -3.86*** 
 
-0.001 -0.85 
BETA + 0.003 5.05*** 
 
0.003 5.00*** 
 
0.005 7.13*** 
SIZE - -0.008 -18.20*** 
 
-0.008 -18.12*** 
 
-0.006 -17.40*** 
BM + 0.006 8.00*** 
 
0.006 8.21*** 
 
0.008 11.99*** 
LEV + 0.041 14.72*** 
 
0.041 14.55*** 
 
0.027 11.73*** 
SPREAD + 0.354 4.18*** 
 
0.350 4.14*** 
 
0.206 3.56*** 
RET - -0.008 -9.56*** 
 
-0.008 -9.68*** 
 
-0.005 -6.22*** 
RETVOL + 0.119 10.91*** 
 
0.123 11.10*** 
 
0.099 7.65*** 
APDAC + 0.001 4.20*** 
 
0.001 4.78*** 
 
0.001 3.43*** 
TAX*APDAC + 0.013 6.00*** 
 
0.013 3.82*** 
 
0.001 2.01** 
          
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  26.02  25.77  24.30 
N  33,662  33,662  28,777 
Panel B: Accrual quality 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.142 23.09*** 
 
0.137 22.83*** 
 
0.112 16.23*** 
TAX ? -0.036 -3.34*** 
 
-0.041 -3.39*** 
 
-0.005 -3.47*** 
BETA + 0.004 5.31*** 
 
0.004 5.04*** 
 
0.007 5.96*** 
SIZE - -0.007 -15.81*** 
 
-0.007 -15.37*** 
 
-0.006 -10.48*** 
BM + 0.007 8.81*** 
 
0.008 10.06*** 
 
0.012 10.59*** 
LEV + 0.043 14.44*** 
 
0.040 14.15*** 
 
0.048 11.36*** 
SPREAD + 0.353 3.68*** 
 
0.331 3.62*** 
 
0.540 5.39*** 
RET - -0.009 -9.20*** 
 
-0.008 -8.62*** 
 
-0.020 -16.25*** 
RETVOL + 0.114 9.86*** 
 
0.117 9.29*** 
 
0.162 9.04*** 
AQ + 0.147 9.80*** 
 
0.199 9.72*** 
 
0.159 6.66*** 
TAX*AQ + 0.097 2.58*** 
 
0.396 2.06** 
 
0.037 1.91* 
          
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  26.42  25.61  24.84 
N  30,833  30,833  26,774 
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Table 7: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Information Quality (H2c) 
(Con’t) 
Panel C: Tax accrual quality 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.145 22.49*** 
 
0.144 22.24*** 
 
0.132 24.09*** 
TAX ? -0.058 -5.88*** 
 
-0.049 -5.04*** 
 
-0.007 -5.02*** 
BETA + 0.004 5.10*** 
 
0.004 5.17*** 
 
0.005 6.37*** 
SIZE - -0.008 -15.53*** 
 
-0.008 -15.49*** 
 
-0.006 -16.10*** 
BM + 0.007 8.29*** 
 
0.007 8.25*** 
 
0.009 11.11*** 
LEV + 0.042 13.97*** 
 
0.042 13.83*** 
 
0.034 12.64*** 
SPREAD + 0.332 3.48*** 
 
0.330 3.45*** 
 
0.227 3.19*** 
RET - -0.008 -9.18*** 
 
-0.009 -9.39*** 
 
-0.005 -6.25*** 
RETVOL + 0.118 9.35*** 
 
0.121 9.50*** 
 
0.098 6.91*** 
TAXAQ + 0.223 4.66*** 
 
0.232 4.75*** 
 
0.323 6.08*** 
TAX*TAXAQ + 1.068 3.13*** 
 
0.876 2.56*** 
 
0.189 3.01*** 
         
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  26.63  26.44  26.17 
N  28,726  28,726  25,839 
This table reports the regression results of the role of information quality on the relation between tax 
avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). 
In Panel A, we report the results when the information quality is proxied by performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals. In Panel B, we report the results when the information quality is proxied by 
accrual quality. In Panel C, we report the results when the information quality is proxied by tax 
accrual quality. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. In each Panel, 
Column 1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the results using 
PBTD to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax avoidance.  
Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries dummies are 
not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for 
cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Tax Avoidance and Alternative proxies for Cost of Equity 
Panel A: VL_PEG 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.108 11.55*** 
 
0.106 11.36*** 
 
0.106 9.83*** 
TAX ? -0.059 -5.10*** 
 
-0.066 -5.88*** 
 
-0.003 -2.85*** 
BETA + 0.008 5.87*** 
 
0.008 5.81*** 
 
0.006 4.32*** 
SIZE - -0.004 -6.97*** 
 
-0.004 -6.80*** 
 
-0.003 -5.44*** 
BM + 0.008 6.53*** 
 
0.008 6.56*** 
 
0.009 8.45*** 
LEV + 0.043 9.12*** 
 
0.042 8.86*** 
 
0.032 7.35*** 
SPREAD + 0.421 4.53*** 
 
0.428 4.62*** 
 
0.402 4.44*** 
RET - -0.019 -11.10*** 
 
-0.019 -10.96*** 
 
-0.017 -10.69*** 
RETVOL + 0.196 10.94*** 
 
0.197 11.24*** 
 
0.179 10.58*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  34.50  34.47  33.25 
N  11,086  11,086  9,724 
Panel B: VL_DIV 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.062 2.98*** 
 
0.060 2.89*** 
 
0.037 2.92*** 
TAX ? -0.048 -3.96*** 
 
-0.055 -3.52*** 
 
-0.002 -1.93** 
BETA + 0.009 5.28*** 
 
0.009 5.19*** 
 
0.002 1.40 
SIZE - -0.001 -0.95 
 
-0.001 -0.81 
 
0.000 -0.09 
BM + 0.005 3.11*** 
 
0.005 3.09*** 
 
0.013 9.19*** 
LEV + 0.044 7.72*** 
 
0.044 7.64*** 
 
0.026 4.68*** 
SPREAD + 0.560 4.88*** 
 
0.576 5.03*** 
 
0.574 5.58*** 
RET - -0.022 -9.13*** 
 
-0.022 -9.02*** 
 
-0.042 -20.43*** 
RETVOL + 0.204 8.99*** 
 
0.205 9.13*** 
 
0.154 7.24*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  22.76  22.69  24.73 
N  10,639  10,639  8,703 
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Table 8: Tax Avoidance and Alternative proxies for Cost of Equity (Con’t) 
Panel C: MAVG_R 
 
 TAX = BTD 
 
TAX = PBTD 
 
TAX = CETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.156 21.35*** 
 
0.155 21.43*** 
 
0.127 20.54*** 
TAX ? -0.056 -9.44*** 
 
-0.055 -10.19*** 
 
-0.005 -5.40*** 
BETA + 0.005 5.95*** 
 
0.005 5.94*** 
 
0.003 4.08*** 
SIZE - -0.010 -22.58*** 
 
-0.011 -22.71*** 
 
-0.006 -13.12*** 
BM + 0.010 10.44*** 
 
0.010 10.27*** 
 
0.015 15.32*** 
LEV + 0.052 14.49*** 
 
0.053 14.46*** 
 
0.042 13.00*** 
SPREAD + 0.055    1.14 
 
0.045 0.95 
 
0.195 3.78*** 
RET - -0.028 -22.73*** 
 
-0.029 -23.27*** 
 
-0.018 -15.66*** 
RETVOL + 0.216 17.08*** 
 
0.218 17.56*** 
 
0.175 10.47*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  34.86  34.83  31.56 
N  34,095  34,095  25,443 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the alternative 
proxies for cost of equity capital. In Panel A, the dependent variable for the cost of equity is VL_PEG. 
In Panel B, the dependent variable for the cost of equity is VL_DIV. In Panel C, the dependent 
variable for the cost of equity is MAVG_R. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table 1. Column 1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the results 
using PBTD to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax 
avoidance.  Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries 
dummies are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to 
control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Alternative Proxies for Tax Avoidance  
 
 Alternative measures for less aggressive form of tax 
avoidance 
 
Measures for most aggressive tax avoidance 
 
 TAX = ETR1 
(1) 
 
TAX = ETR2 
(2) 
TAX=SHELTER 
(3) 
TAX=UTB 
(4) 
 
Exp. Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.137 24.33*** 
 
0.135 25.68*** 0.149 24.93*** 0.139 14.13*** 
TAX ? -0.002 -1.71* 
 
-0.002 -3.62*** 0.000 -0.39 0.122 2.56*** 
BETA + 0.004 6.50*** 
 
0.005 6.82*** 0.004 5.29*** 0.008 3.90*** 
SIZE - -0.007 -15.76*** 
 
-0.007 -19.81*** -0.008 -17.86*** -0.006 -8.34*** 
BM + 0.008 12.38*** 
 
0.008 11.66*** 0.006 7.86*** 0.007 4.24*** 
LEV + 0.033 13.07*** 
 
0.038 14.43*** 0.042 15.18*** 0.023 3.77*** 
SPREAD + 0.300 3.57*** 
 
0.413 9.28*** 0.362 4.16*** 0.836 3.01*** 
RET - -0.005 -5.91*** 
 
-0.006 -6.71*** -0.010 -10.68*** -0.009 -3.39*** 
RETVOL + 0.101 7.73*** 
 
0.107 8.15*** 0.132 11.55*** 0.095 4.52*** 
            
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes 
Yes 
25.51 
33,806 
Yes 
Yes 
17.02 
4,145 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  23.63  23.93 
N  30,079  28,655 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity 
capital (R_PEG). Column 1 shows the results using ETR1 to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the results using ETR2 to proxy tax avoidance, Column 3 
shows the results using SHELTER to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 4 shows the results using UTB to proxy tax avoidance. The detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 1. Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries are not tabulated for brevity. The t-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
51 
 
Table 10: Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – Change Analysis 
 
 ΔTAX = ΔBTD 
 
ΔTAX = ΔPBTD 
 
ΔTAX = ΔCETR 
 
Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
Intercept ? 0.003 1.31 
 
0.003 1.31 
 
0.002 0.86 
ΔTAX ? -0.012 -2.21** 
 
-0.009 -2.12** 
 
-0.002 -2.39** 
ΔBETA + -0.001 -1.06 
 
-0.001 -1.02 
 
-0.002 -1.75* 
ΔSIZE - -0.045 -21.17*** 
 
-0.045 -21.10*** 
 
-0.042 -23.06*** 
ΔBM + 0.008 4.06*** 
 
0.008 3.95*** 
 
0.008 4.29*** 
ΔLEV + -0.019 -2.74*** 
 
-0.018 -2.67*** 
 
-0.011 -1.93** 
ΔSPREAD + 0.191 2.75*** 
 
0.190 2.73*** 
 
0.114 1.77* 
ΔRET - -0.008 -7.63*** 
 
-0.008 -7.77*** 
 
-0.008 -8.04*** 
ΔRETVOL + 0.030 3.19*** 
 
0.031 3.27*** 
 
0.031 3.75*** 
        
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2 
(%)  19.84  19.80  19.31 
N  33,464  33,464  29,034 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between changes in tax avoidance and changes 
in the cost of equity capital. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Column 
1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows the results using PBTD to 
proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax avoidance.  
Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries are not 
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for 
cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
